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RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST: 
A Blueprint for Government Integrity 
I believe that a continued commitment to improvement by our Legislature, a 
persistent, undeviating emphasis on reform by the executive -- together with your help 
-- can make this the beginning of the most exciting reform era in this State's history. 
It will take foresight, tough advocacy, intelligence and courage, but this great 
State has proven over and over for 21 O years that it is capable of that kind of strength 
when needed. And this surely is a moment of need ... and a moment of great 
opportunity. 
Governor Mario M. Cuomo 
Remarks to New York State Commission 
on Government Integrity 
September 9, 1987 
The public is entitled to expect from its servants a set of standards far above 
the morals of the marketplace. Those who exercise public and political power are 
trustees of the hopes and aspirations of all mankind. They are the trustees of a 
system of government in which the people must be able to place their absolute trust; 
for the preservation of their welfare, their safety and all they hold dear depends upon 
it. 
Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Public Papers 
1954, p. 10 
Instances of corruption are commonplace in practically every segment of American 
society. From Wall Street to government, the failures of those who wield great power and 
influence and in whom we place great trust is chronic in modern life. 
The last few years have been a particularly bad time for government integrity in New 
York. Since 1985, New York City has been rocked by a series of highly publicized 
scandals, arguably the worst since the days of Tammany Hall. One borough president was 
convicted of felonies; another committed suicide while under investigation; a congressman 
was recently convicted of bribery and extortion; former party chairmen in two boroughs 
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were convicted of serious crimes; and a number of agency heads, judges, and lesser 
officials have either been convicted or forced to resign under a cloud of suspicion. And the 
City does not have a monopoly on malfeasance. Scandals have also plagued the New 
York State Legislature and governments elsewhere in the State. 
Although certainly the vast majority of public officials are dedicated and honest, 
these cases are representative of others in New York in the last few years. And probably, 
there are more corrupt public officials who have not been -- and may never be -- caught 
and punished. Our democratic system is in crisis. 
Although the scope of recent scandals is dishearteningly large, many of our greatest 
institutions and reforms have come about in the course of courageous struggles against 
corruption. The terrible disruption created when a public servant violates the public trust 
eventually awakens the citizenry and opens a possibility for change. It arouses us from 
cynicism and complacency and alerts us to our common responsibility not only to halt but 
also to reverse ethical decline. 
Consider the chaos of the 1780's which, like every other age, had corrupt elements. 
The Framers of our Constitution did not throw up their hands in despair or become cynical 
about government and the political process. Instead, they gave us one of the greatest 
examples of political leadership in history. They scrapped an unworkable system for an 
entirely new one, viewing morality, virtue, and religion as insufficient deterrents to the 
tendency of people who possess power to abuse it. The Framers recognized the ineludible 
temptations of power, and consequently that controls and precautions are necessary if 
democratic government is to survive. The Constitution they wrote grants power and 
simultaneously limits it in every possible manner. As Madison noted in the Federalist 
Papers: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition ... lt may be a reflection on human 
nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" 
References to the Framers may seem distant from the challenges of the present. 
They are not. The success of the Framers suggests that if we are to convert this period 
into one of renewal and reform, we must do as they did: take a hard look at ourselves 
and adopt substantial changes in the way we conduct our affairs. And we must do so 
soon if we want to avert widespread political apathy and public mistrust. 
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Obviously, as a society we must concentrate great resources on enforcing the law. 
Wrongdoers must be uncovered and punished. And if this requires additional resources, 
then we must be serious about honest government and commit whatever time and monies 
are necessary to do the job properly. 
Investigations and prosecutions are not enough, however, to meet the challenges we 
face. Honest government officials labor under burdens unparalleled by those imposed 
upon the rest of us. When those burdens become too great, and there is no clear moral 
support from the community, they can easily fall prey to the pressures they confront. 
Private citizens have an obligation to make their ethical expectations clear by 
communicating with their representatives, voting and participating in political party activities. 
Most important, we need sweeping reforms of our laws to safeguard the public sector from 
the pressures brought to bear by private sector special interests and to reduce the 
temptation of officials to abuse their trust. 
With the approval of the State Legislature, Governor Cuomo created the Commission 
on April 21, 1987 through executive order1 under the Moreland Act. In doing so, he stated 
his hope "that we move as soon as possible to make tangible reform, real reform, to begin 
the process of converting this period of castigation, accusation, and scandal into a period 
of enlightenment..." The Commission's mandate is very broad: to investigate laws and 
practices in the state and municipal governments in New York that foster corruption and the 
appearance of improper behavior.2 The Commission has no law enforcement functions, and 
is charged with a vastly different task than prosecutors or other investigatory bodies. 
Although the Commission has subpoena power and examines specific cases, it does so in 
order to suggest system-wide reforms necessary to restore our public life. 
This report summarizes the most important recommendations to date, but the 
Commission's work is far from complete.3 We have ongoing investigations in several critical 
areas, on which we hope to issue recommendations soon. Although ethical issues in local 
government are no less thorny than in state government, existing laws governing local 
1See appendix for text of executive order. 
2The Commission's mandate does not extend to 'the affairs or management of the Legislature,' but to 'the management 
and affairs of any department, board, bureau, commission (including any public benefit corporation) or political subdivision of 
the State.' (Executive Order No. 88.1, Section I) . 
3See appendix B for a list of reports and other information available from the Commission. 
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ethics are often contradictory, inadequate, and in some cases, overly restrictive and 
excessive. The Commission has prepared a draft Municipal Ethics Act that sets uniform 
minimum ethical standards for public servants in communities throughout the state. We are 
also in the early stages of looking into the way various government agencies, municipalities, 
and authorities and other quasi-governmental organizations award lucrative contracts and 
purchase goods and services. These bodies spend vast sums of taxpayers' money, yet the 
mechanisms to monitor their actions are almost nonexistent. If not properly regulated, this 
area can be a fertile breeding ground for conflicts of interest and other abuses. 
Another ongoing investigation involves government hiring and patronage practices. 
Although patronage has a legitimate role in government hiring, it also poses special 
problems. Hard working public servants are demoralized when they see appointments 
made mainly for political reasons, and in fact, the professionalism of the government's work 
force is debased. Even the appearance of hiring decisions based on factors other than 
merit shakes the public's confidence in the integrity of government and the competence of 
government employees. 
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
The idea is to prevent. .. the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate 
funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the Legislature to these halls in order 
to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of 
the public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the 
confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political 
institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of 
our Government. 4 
Elihu Root, 1894 
In a democracy, holding elective office is one of the highest forms of public service. 
We entrust to our office-holders not only the business of government, but the ultimate 
protection of our liberty and community. And as a result, impropriety in the way candidates 
campaign strikes at the heart of our democratic system. 
To compete successfully, candidates must have public relations advisors and media 
consultants and, for the highest offices, they must raise and spend millions of dollars. 
Although we complain about the expense of elections and the superficiality of campaigns 
based on 30-second television spots, for many these expensive advertisements provide the 
only information on which to base their votes. The result is contradictory demands on 
candidates. We expect them to wage effective campaigns for public office, yet we are 
suspicious when they raise the money they need to do it. There is only one way out of 
this dilemma, and that is campaign finance reform. 
4Elihu Root served as U.S. Senator from New York, U.S. Secretary of War, U.S. Secretary of State, and won the 1912 
Nobel Peace Prize. The passage is from a speech he gave urging a constitu1ional convention in New York to pass campaign 
finance reform. 
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Campaign finance laws in New York are a disgrace. They impose minimal limitations 
and are not vigorously enforced resulting in not only corruption and the appearance of 
impropriety, but voter skepticism about the electoral process itself. 
Good campaign finance regulations must satisfy a number of objectives: limiting the 
undue influence of wealthy special interests, insuring that the public is informed about the 
sources and amounts of a candidate's support, providing for adequate enforcement, 
encouraging democratic competition for office and promoting confidence in government. 
New York's regulations fail these tests miserably. 
CONTRIBlJflON LIMITS: Currently, the ceiling on contributions for political purposes by 
individuals is so high it can hardly be termed a limit: $150,000 per year. Large 
contributors dominate New York political campaigns. For example, among the three New 
York Citywide officeholders -- Mayor Edward Koch, Comptroller Harrison Goldin, and City 
Council President Andrew Stein -- no more than 4% of their total contributions in the last 
five years came from gifts of less than 100 dollars. More than 80% of the total in each 
case came from gifts of $1,000 and above, and between 43% and 65% came from gifts of 
$5,000 or more. 
The contribution pattern of the four statewide officeholders -- Governor Mario 
Cuomo, Lieutenant Governor Stan Lundine, Comptroller Edward Regan and Attorney 
General Robert Abrams -- is similar. No more than 5% of their totals in the last five years 
came from gifts of less than $100, roughly 80% from gifts over $1,000 and between 24% 
and 55% from gifts of $5,000 and more. And less than 0.3% of the voters in New York 
State even make political contributions, further strengthening the power of the wealthy elite 
that give huge amounts. The current law's outrageously high limits render the gift of the 
average person insignificant, while insuring that the gifts of the wealthy remain the 
cornerstone of every campaign. 
Our study of legislative campaign funding practices reveals a similarly disturbing 
pattern. Corporations, unions and their political action committees (PACs) accounted for 
roughly 60% of the $11 million raised during a five year period by the Democratic and 
Republican Senate and Assembly legislative committees. PAC contributions to these 
committees are virtually unlimited by the law. Contributions as high as $10,000 and 
$20,000 from PACs are commonplace, with single donations swelling to a staggering 
$100,000. Top legislative leaders control the committees' coffers, funneling large sums to 
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hotly contested races and transferring lesser amounts to the campaigns of incumbents 
seeking reelection to "safe" seats. This creates a climate of indebtedness, with some 
candidates owing their success to party leaders who are in turn dangerously dependent on 
special interests. 
Corporate contributions are similarly unrestrained. Technically, of course, they are 
limited ($5,000 per year) but there is a huge loophole: the gifts of subsidiary and affiliated 
corporations are not included in the parent company's total. A real estate developer testified 
to the Commission that in a single month he used 21 subsidiary corporations as vehicles 
for giving $100,000 to City Comptroller Harrison Goldin. "My friend needed help, so I 
helped him," he said. The federal government has banned corporate contributions since 
1907; 19 other states have followed. It is long past time that New York did the same. 
More pernicious still, the current law allows those doing business with the 
government to contribute directly to the very people deciding who gets the government's 
business. As an example, more than 90% of State Comptroller Regan's campaign 
contributions between January 1983 and January 1988 came from the financial, legal and 
real estate communities; three groups that benefit directly from his office's decisions as sole 
manager of the state's $38 billion pension fund. On August 29, 1985, another real estate 
developer gave $30,000 to City Council President Andrew Stein through 17 corporations he 
controlled. Such contributors' profits are directly affected by discretionary actions by Stein 
and the other members of the Board of Estimate, who in turn rely on such large 
contributions to get elected. 
The testimony received at our public hearing from various business leaders suggests 
that it would be naive to think that these gifts are always a pure expression of democratic 
support. One witness said he contributed "more to avoid a negative impact, than trying to 
incur a positive result." Commission staff members were told by some business people that 
"it would be bad business judgment to stop contributing to campaigns." Some of those 
testifying had no idea how much they had given; others, playing it safe, gave to different 
candidates vying for the same office and, not surprisingly, saw no necessity to vote in the 
election in which they had contributed. What is clear is that many business people see 
their contributions as a cost of doing business, a payment for benefits they might not 
otherwise receive. 
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It is not the Commission's function to prove a direct link between a big contribution 
and a lucrative contract. That is a job for prosecutors. Yet it is undeniable that large 
contributions by those doing business with government provide access that average citizens 
do not enjoy, and create an appearance of impropriety that damages the voters' confidence 
that our our democratic process is fair. 5 
DISCLOSURE: Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate. As Justice Brandeis 
stated, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."6 
Unfortunately, the current disclosure requirements involving contributors are so inadequate 
they seem designed to hide a candidate's sources of support. The Commission's 
investigation has uncovered several examples: Candidates do not have to reveal their 
contributors' employers, allowing the executives of a single company to make large 
individual contributions that add up to what is in effect a huge secret corporate contribution. 
Insuring that a candidate is aware of the extent of a company's support is easy: the 
executives' checks simply are delivered in a single bundle, and the public is none the wiser. 
Political advertisements do not have to state their sponsors, keeping the public in the dark 
about who is behind the slick and persuasive political messages that bombard them before 
many elections.7 
The State Board of Elections, which is supposed to correct these problems, instead 
compounds them. It does not even insist that the current disclosure forms -- which are 
inadequate to begin with -- be typed, resulting often in completely illegible and useless 
filings. It has also failed to computerize and publicize the vital data it does receive. 
5rhe Commission proposes limiting individual contributions to the following ranges: Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and 
Comptroller of the State of New York : $2,500 to $4,000; State Legislators: $1,500 to $2,000; Mayor, City Council President, and 
Comptroller of New York City : $2,500 to $4,000; All other city and County offices: $1,000 to $2,000; Town, village and other 
local offices: $500 to $1,000. The Commission also recommends that PAC contributions be limited to similar ranges in their 
contributions to candidates, and to $5,000 in their contributions to state, legislative and local party committees. 
6Brandeis, Other People's Money, 62 (Nat'I Home Library Foundation ed., 1933). 
7Contrast this with the law governing federal elections that requires that all political advertisements that 'expressly 
advocat[e] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,' or ask for contributions, clearly state their sponsors and 
whether the advertisement has been authorized by the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. §441d(a) . 
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Without computerization and enhanced disclosure requirements, the public cannot know 
who has paid the fare to bring their leaders to office.8 
PUBLIC FUNDING: In the 1986 election cycle, the winners of the four state-wide races 
together spent more than $20 million on their campaigns. In the 1985 election cycle, New 
York City Mayor Edward Koch, Council President Andrew Stein, and Comptroller Harrison 
Goldin, spent a total of more than 1 O million dollars to win their races. When running for 
public office requires enormous expenditures of privately raised funds, challenges to 
incumbents are all but limited to the most wealthy and well-connected. Moreover, huge 
campaign costs pressure candidates to maintain political views that do not offend big 
money interests. 
To address these problems, several states -- and the federal government for 
presidential campaigns -- have adopted public funding. And on November 8, 1988, New 
York City's voters approved public funding for city-wide races by an overwhelming 79% 
margin. 
If properly formulated, public funding can have several salutary effects on the 
political process. First, it provides a constitutional way to limit campaign expenditures. 
Second, public funding encourages more vigorous competition by insuring that challengers 
have sufficient resources to get their message across to the electorate. Third, it helps keep 
the focus of campaigns on political issues rather than on fund-raising. 
Finally, public financing lessens the influence of particularly generous individual 
donors. Public funding gives candidates a source of income that will not demand access 
or favors at some later date. It gives elected officials an independence from vested 
community interests and as a result, the freedom to challenge those interests for the public 
good. And, if properly designed, public funding strengthens the relationship between 
81n an effort to investigate the campaign finance issue thoroughly, the Commission undertook a massive project to 
computerize the records of the Board of Election. That effort is well under way, and as a result, for the first time, it is possible 
for the public and the press to determine the amount of campaign support public officials have received from specific 
individuals and corporations. Printouts of the data base may be borrowed for copying from the Commission's offices, and the 
entire data base is available on computer diskette free of charge. 
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candidates and the public they represent, and will allay the cynical belief that current 
campaign fund-raising practices are a form of "legalized bribery."9 
ENFORCEMENT: Since its creation in 1974, the State Board of Elections has been an 
ineffectual watchdog. It has done little more than collect candidates' campaign contribution 
and expenditure filings, let them sit undisturbed for five years, and then destroy them. The 
State Board does not computerize, analyze or disclose the important information it receives 
in any meaningful way. Without computerization and analysis, the Board cannot enforce 
the basic features of the Election Law. 
New York's Board of Elections lags behind other states. The Assistant Staff Director 
of the U.S. Federal Election Commission testified before the Commission: 
If you want to be a leader ... you have got to be out front, you have got to be 
thinking of new ideas, you have to have a budget, you have to have the staff to do it, 
you have to have the support of the Legislature to do it. I don't think that New York 
has done very much at all. I would probably put New York where New Jersey was 
about fifteen years ago ... 
New York has a long, long way to go. I don't think it is anywhere near being a 
leader. You are not even in consideration in that regard. 
The testimony of a former Board of Elections investigator gives a clue about why we 
have fallen short, 
It seemed like the [State Board of Elections} Commissioners didn't want 
anything new happening, or anything innovative happening within the Board. They 
just wanted to keep things nice and quiet and not distribute that type of information 
that could lead to questions, and potential problems ... 
Commissioners of the Board of Elections are appointed under a system that all but 
guarantees complacency by the Board toward its campaign financing responsibilities. The 
budget as well as the appointments to the Board are controlled by the most powerful 
people the Board is supposed to police. Under the current practice, the Governor must 
appoint one of the people recommended by the chairperson of the State Democratic 
Committee, one of the people recommended by the chairperson of the State Republican 
9rhe Commission supports public funding for state-wide offices, and believes other municipalities should be permitted to 
institute such programs if they wish. However, after careful study, the Commission has declined at this time to recommend 
public funding for legislative races. The Commission feels that the vast majority of legislative candidates do not currently 
spend excessive amounts on their general election campaigr.\s and, accordingly, that these elections do not present the 
various evils attendant to excessively costly campaigns. The Commission also believes that the effect of the other reforms we 
have proposed should be studied carefully before public funds are committed to legislative races. 
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Committee, the person jointly recommended by the Democratic Party's two legislative 
leaders and the person jointly recommended by the Republican Party's two legislative 
leaders.10 
The resulting potential for conflict of interest is obvious even to the Board's 
Executive Director, who testified before the Commission that, 
I think another thing we have to recognize is that in effect, the Legislature is 
our clientele. We are asking them for more auditors, more investigators, so that we 
can do a better job reviewing the reports of legislators, and so forth. I think there is 
a reluctance there. 
The solution is clear: a new, independent agency must be formed with sole 
responsibility for enforcing the campaign finance laws. This new agency should be charged 
only with campaign financing responsibilities. Ballot administration and voter registration 
should be the responsibility of a separate body. Campaign financing experts consulted by 
the Commission were unanimous in their view that these areas should be separated. As 
the former chairman of both the New Jersey and federal campaign financing agencies 
testified, 
My feeling and conclusion is that it would be best to have a single agency 
charged with campaign finance disclosure responsibility, simply because of the nature 
of the work involved. 
Contrast it, if you will, with what the State Board of Elections does. They do 
extremely important work but of an entirely different sort. They are involved in 
insuring that everything goes well on Election Day, that we all vote, and if that ever 
becomes tarnished, we are all in trouble and we know it. 
But what you're talking about in terms of campaign financing is vety 
sophisticated investigation, and I think that's best left to one specific agency, if we are 
talking about the financing of elections. 
If both responsibilities are given to a single agency, that agency will inevitably devote more 
of its resources and attention to issues it must resolve -- such as which candidates are to 
appear on the ballot -- than to issues such as post-election review of the adequacy of a 
candidate's financial disclosure statements. 
The Commissioners of this new campaign finance enforcement agency should be 
appointed by the Governor from choices provided by an independent nominating 
1
°The potential effects of the Board's ties to the political establishment are further exacerbated by the fact that 
Commissioners serve two-year terms, making it easy to replace them quickly if the Board's actions are unpopular. 
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commission. Such a nominating commission, patterned after the successful independent 
commission which nominates judges for the Court of Appeals, should include members of 
civic groups, business and religious leaders, as well as people more directly involved in 
politics. The new agency must be adequately funded, and its budget must be insulated 
from reprisal by public officials. 
We must guarantee that the taxpayers' money for campaign financing will be spent 
carefully, that contribution limits will mean something, and that they will have easy access to 
matters of public record. But without an effective, independent enforcement agency these 
reforms will be as meaningless as criminal laws without police. 
* * * 
New Yorkers are well aware of the problems with our current campaign finance 
system. According to a poll conducted for the Commission, 77% of voters support 
campaign finance reform, 78% believe that individuals have far too little influence over state 
government, and approximately 60% think that corporations, labor unions and political 
parties give in order to "influence or control" a candidate. 
We find these statistics shocking. When 60% of the registered voters in our state 
believe that corporate, union and party contributions are a form of legal bribery rather than 
an expression of support, our system is in a state of crisis. The extent of voter cynicism in 
New York is alarming. Our leaders must take the steps necessary to restore public 
confidence. The Commission has not worked on any issue more important than campaign 
finance reform. 
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JUDICIAL SELECTION 
I'm against elected judges because the way you get elected judges is the 
way they do it in the Bronx. You get three political leaders together, boom, they pick 
a guy and he's the judge, he's elected. 
Governor Mario Cuomo, 1988 
It is very difficult to take people who are successful in practice and say to 
them, become a judge in our State system, work well, work diligently, and then if 
everything is all right you can go back to the political leader and perhaps seek 
renomination to run again. 
New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler 
... it is hard indeed to face, in middle or later age and with your practice and 
clients gone, the prospect of being turned out of office because you have made an 
honest but unpopular decision. Indeed, I am continually gratified and amazed at the 
frequency with which my colleagues on the state bench do just that; but it is a test to 
which they should not be put, over and over and day by day. 
Thomas Gibbs Gee, Circuit Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Houston 
Unlike the other branches of government which are primarily concerned with the 
wishes of majorities, the judicial branch is charged with protecting the basic rights of 
individuals. In doing so, the judiciary necessarily must focus on the facts of particular 
cases, blocking out personal or political prejudice, bias, and self-interest. At their best, our 
courts serve as an institutional refuge for the oppressed, the powerless and the mistreated; 
a place where any citizen can turn for a just and fair hearing. 
Even the appearance of partiality in the judiciary is dangerous. Without public 
confidence in the independence of our judges, the moral foundation of the rule of law is 
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threatened. As Chief Judge Wachtler stated, ''the whole justice system is balanced very 
delicately on what we call the public trust." 
Most judges in New York are chosen by elections that are almost totally controlled 
by political party leaders, a system which clashes with the ideal of an independent and 
nonpartisan judiciary. By promoting political favoritism and rewarding party loyalty, judicial 
elections enhance political leaders' undue influence over judges, discourage lawyers without 
political connections from seeking judgeships, and threaten public confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system. Partly for these reasons the Framers of the Federal 
Constitution mandated an appointive system for Federal judges and Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, and the voters of New York State chose this method for their 
highest court. 
In virtually every county in New York, a few political party leaders effectively control 
judgeships by making the crucial decisions: who will be designated or nominated, and 
who will receive the support of the party organization critical to election. As one political 
leader testified before the Commission, 
I don't recall a judicial convention in twenty years that the candidates 
recommended by the County Leader were not designated. There were conventions 
where other names were put in but they never were successful in getting enough 
votes to be the designees of the Convention ... 
I'm talking about Queens, because I reside there. I know for a fact this is 
true in Manhattan and other counties in the City and the State, where the Judicial 
Convention really operated as a rubber stamp of the County Leader and it has done 
so for many years, probably continues to do so. 
The overriding concern of these party leaders is quite naturally political: advancing 
the party organization, cementing party loyalty, and consolidating their power. But what is 
natural for political leaders is not necessarily healthy for the judiciary. Choosing judges 
based on party service demeans the bench by drastically narrowing the pool of potential 
judges, by introducing a standard other than judicial excellence, and by creating criteria for 
reelection which are at best irrelevant and at worst dangerous. The testimony of another 
political leader about the selection process is particularly revealing: 
Well it's based on friendships, relationships built up over the years. 
For example, there's a young man that goes to my church who has been --
I've known him since he was a Little Leaguer, so now he's a lawyer, and he also 
belongs to my political club, and I sort of look to the day when I will be able to 
nominate him for a judgeship, you know. 
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So that's a particular personal relationship. If you run out of friends, then you 
look to see other considerations. You don't hardly run out of friends before 
somebody else comes up with a friend, and rather than take another opportunity, you 
may have to step aside and let somebody else put forth their candidate. 
Obviously, the only requirements that I know of for being a judge, and I may 
be wrong, is having been admitted [to the bar] for ten years, and I don't even know 
of any other objective test besides that...So if you have been admitted to practice and 
you are without experiences of a negative nature, I assume that on the face of it, that 
qualifies you to become a judge. 
New York can and must do better. Our State and its citizens deserve to have the 
finest people that will serve. We expect much from our judges: independence, courage, 
honesty, ability, knowledge, understanding and compassion. Political connections should 
not be the overriding consideration in their selection. 
Obviously, the fact that judges owe their positions to party leaders, and depend on 
them for renomination when their terms expire, directly threatens judicial independence. 
When asked if he would feel pressure in deciding a case where one of the lawyers was a 
political leader who could affect his judicial career, one judge testified, 
Yes I'm human. f'll think about it, and I shouldn't have to think about it. 
shouldn 't have to have my energies dissipated in wondering what the reaction is 
going to be or how I'm going to kill myself for the next election ... but that's the system. 
It should be changed. 
The appeal of elections is clear. Allowing the voters to choose who will judge them 
sounds like the fulfillment of a democratic ideal. However, the rosy picture of the informed 
voter carefully choosing the candidate he or she believes can best be fair, impartial and 
judicious has nothing to do with the election of judges in New York. 
Currently, judgeships in the Supreme, Surrogate's, County, City, District, Civil, and 
Family Courts outside of New York City are elective positions, more than 800 in total. Yet, 
very few people even know the name of any of the judges in their districts, much less the 
names or backgrounds of the range of candidates. 
Judicial races simply do not attract voter interest. Judges must make decisions 
based strictly on the specific facts of an individual case, and it is therefore obviously 
improper for them to make campaign promises about how they would rule on particular 
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issues. 11 For them to do so would institutionalize bias and debase the ideal of 
nonpartisanship. Widespread public cynicism would be the certain outcome. As a result, 
judicial elections are intrinsically "issueless," and it is hopelessly unrealistic to imagine they 
will ever attract the interest of very many voters. 
Moreover, even if genuinely democratic, an elective system would still threaten 
judicial independence. Public officials are concerned with the majority's will. The 
dispensing of justice turns on very different factors; that is why we do not have trial and 
punishment by popular opinion. 
Politics cannot be banished altogether from judicial selection, whether under an 
elective or appointive system. If properly designed, however, an appointive system will 
foster judicial independence and guarantee that qualified candidates without political 
connections have a fair chance to become judges. 
Nominating commissions should be created to send only a limited number of the 
very best candidates to an executive -- such as a Governor or Mayor -- who would then 
make the appointments. By limiting the executive's latitude, we limit the possible influence 
of politics on the choice. To insure that the commissions remain independent, they should 
be composed of a broad range of individuals of various professions and political 
backgrounds, and should be officially charged with making their selections purely on the 
basis of judicial merit. 
A properly designed appointive system will take power out of the hands of 
unaccountable party bosses and give it to elected public officials accountable to the voters 
for their decisions. Appointive systems have been endorsed by every major civic group that 
has studied the issue, including the Citizens Union, Common Cause, the League of Women 
Voters, the Fund for Modern Courts, and the New York City and New York State Bar 
Associations. Nationally, 34 states use appointment to select at least some of their judges, 
and since 1950, every state that has made a change has moved toward appointment. 
We must stop perpetuating the myth that judicial elections have anything to do with 
democratic choice. They do not and they cannot. The right kind of appointive system will 
11This potential impropriety is recognized by the American and New York Bar Associations. Canon 7 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct prohibits candidates from expressing their views on 'disputed legal or political issues.' 
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hold judicial ability -- not political party service -- paramount, and will give New Yorkers the 
finest judiciary possible. 
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THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT 
Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair. 
George Washington 
Morality can 't be legislated, but behavior can be regulated. 
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. 
But the great pity about virtue being its own reward is that the reward always seems 
so small. It's the appearance, not the fact, of conflict that is so often troubling. 
Appearances do count. And most especially when it affects public officials. The 
appearance of conflict counts almost as much as reality. A great gray area exists 
called unseemliness. It ain 't illegal. But it just ain't right. 
William Satire 
Government both influences and reflects the ethical tenor of our society. As bearers 
of the public trust, our officials must be held to the highest standards of behavior. When 
they falter, they not only betray their responsibilities to the citizens of our State, but they 
encourage us to do the same to each other. As Justice Brandeis wrote, "Our government 
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by 
its example."12 Ethics-in-government legislation is, therefore, doubly important. Not only 
does it deter abuse, it articulates a moral standard for the entire community. 
New York's current Ethics Law falls short in many areas. When the State Legislature 
passed the Ethics Act in 1987, regulating the actions of executive and legislative branch 
officials and employees, it was called an historic advance. Without question it was an 
important step and represents a real improvement over the laws that existed at the time. 
But the Act still has huge loopholes, and some of its enforcement provisions actually tie 
prosecutors' hands. 
120lmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) . 
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The Act paralyzes district attorneys by barring them from prosecuting violations 
without an official referral from one of the oversight commissions the Act created. Unlike 
every other situation in which a crime is committed, a district attorney with evidence that a 
government official has broken the law cannot do anything if the oversight commission has 
not officially transferred the case. 
This referral requirement sends the wrong message to New Yorkers. It teaches that 
while private citizens are subject to the inquiries of an independent prosecutor, those who 
hold government office are not. It suggests that public officials have something to hide, 
and intend to hide it. The referral requirement is clearly a double standard, and it is 
probably unconstitutional as well. 13 
In fact, the oversight commission may have good reason for not referring the case: 
the Act forbids the commission from imposing civil fines once it has referred a case to a 
prosecutor, even if the criminal prosecution is unsuccessful. Faced with the choice of an 
inadequate but assured civil penalty, and the possibility of no penalty at all, the oversight 
commission may hesitate to refer even the most egregious examples of official misconduct. 
The Act's preferential treatment of public officials goes beyond inhibiting 
investigation. Under some interpretations, the law gives an official who intentionally files 
false disclosure information 15 days after he or she is caught to revise their filings secretly 
and without penalty, an opportunity not afforded any other person accused of breaking a 
law. Our public leaders must be held to the highest possible ethical standards. Yet the 
Ethics Act gives them a legal loophole unavailable to the average citizen. As District 
Attorney Morgenthau wrote, "No other law permits a violator such an opportunity to undo 
his crime with full confidentiality. The result is that serious misconduct will go 
unpunished.1114 
13The New York Constitution provides: 
The power of the grand juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of public 
officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of information in connection with 
such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law. 
N. Y. Const. art. I, § 6. See also Letter from Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney of Kings County, to Governor Mario M. 
Cuomo (July 24, 1987); Memorandum from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York to Governor Cuomo at 6 (July 7, 
1987). Both contained in Governor's Bill Jacket for S.6441 . 
14New York County District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, writing on behalf of the District Attorneys Association of New 
York. Letter to Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 15, 1987). 
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The Act also permits state officials to represent private clients before all municipal 
agencies for any purpose, and before state agencies in a number of crucial areas including 
certain tax and criminal matters. This creates obvious problems. Because budget 
appropriations and other decisions made in Albany affect municipalities and state agencies, 
local and state officials may be subjected to excessive pressure, even if not intended. 
Government officials' appearances before those agencies are inevitably intimidating, and 
may taint the eventual decision in the public eye. They should be forbidden. 
There is one area where the Act goes too far, and in fact overburdens public 
officials. The Act mandates absurdly excessive financial disclosure requirements for all 
government employees making more than $30,000 per year (roughly 70,000 in all, not 
counting employees of Public Authorities), unless they appear before the appropriate 
commission and demonstrate that their job duties do not necessitate disclosure. The 
disclosure form the Act requires is 7 pages long and correspondingly detailed. In other 
words, the enforcement commissions throughout the State will be burdened with more than 
490,000 pages of financial disclosure information, a mountain of paper that will effectively 
block enforcement of the law when it matters, and impose an onerous burden on tens of 
thousands of employees covered for no good reason. 
It is difficult enough to attract talented people into government service. Many more 
will be discouraged if they are required to reveal publicly the particulars of their personal 
finances. Certainly, broad financial disclosure is important for people in policy-making 
positions. But those positions should be defined by the responsibilities that accompany 
them, not by salary level. 15 
Although most public officials are dedicated and honest, the faith of many people in 
the government has been weakened. Our system depends on public confidence in the 
basic integrity of the government and its elected officials. In a democracy, distrust can be 
as damaging as corruption itself. A reformed Ethics Act would not only deter wrongdoing, 
it would also be the best demonstration that the political leadership of New York is 
committed to fundamental change. 
15Commissioners James L. Magavern and Richard D. Emery support a different approach to disclosure, which they believe 
would prove both less intrusive upon the personal lives of state employees and more effective in protecting the public interest. 
Instead of annual, uniform disclosure for all covered employees, regardless of relevance to their particular jobs, the Act should 
require disclosure on a transactional basis. Before taking action in a particular matter in which the employee (or a party 
related to the employee by family or business) has an interest, the employee should be required to file a transactional 
disclosure statement identifying that interest and relationship in reasonable detail. 
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BALLOT ACCESS 
The problem of ballot access has eliminated or completely crippled many 
candidacies, for many years. They have been almost exclusively insurgent 
candidacies in less we/I-publicized races, and many had legitimate popular support 
for a place on the ballot... The ballot access problem has - for too many years -
impeded or eliminated valid candidacies, deprived voters of a choice, and damaged 
our political system. 16 
Vance Benguiat, Executive Director, 
Citizens Union of the City of New York 
The heart of our democratic ideal is the right of the people to choose whom they 
want to represent and lead them. This maxim has guided our country and state for more 
than 200 years. Our commitment to it has been tested in struggles over voting rights, the 
infamous "Jim Crow" laws, and redistricting. Today in our state, the test of our commitment 
comes in a less dramatic, but no less important, form. New York's ballot access laws are 
supposed to protect the political process from frivolous candidates, and insure that qualified 
voters decide who gets on the ballot. In reality, they throw serious candidates off the ballot 
for frivolous reasons, and frustrate democratic choice through meaningless litigation. 
Unlike most other states, getting on the primary ballot in New York requires a 
candidate to collect a substantial number of signatures of party members on a nominating 
petition. 11 And unlike other states, the rules governing the validity of the petitions are 
unbelievably complex and rigid. 
Technical defects can nullify entire petitions. A petition may be thrown out simply 
because the person carrying it for the candidate is registered to vote in a district other than 
the one in which the signatures must be obtained, or because the pages of the petition are 
not consecutively numbered. In Erie County in 1984, for example, a candidate for county 
16Statement to Joint Public Hearing of the State Senate and Assembly Election Law Committees on Ballot Access, 
(October 15, 1985). 
17Most states permit a candidate to get on the primary ballot by paying a filing fee, or alternatively through a simpler 
petition process. 
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committeeman was denied a place on the ballot because his two-page designating petition 
was not consecutively numbered. 18 
Similarly, if the person actually carrying the petition fails to date it, or misstates or 
omits various information, such as his or her address or assembly and election districts, the 
entire petition is invalid. For example, in 1979 in Erie County, a candidate for town 
councilman filed a petition with almost twice as many signatures as the law required. 
Unfortunately for the candidate and his many supporters, the people that carried the 
petition failed to list their assembly districts. Because of this the candidate was dropped 
from the ballot, even though listing the assembly district was listing the obvious: the town 
had only one assembly district and all the people carrying the petition lived in the town. 19 
A petition may also be thrown out if its pages are not correctly bound together. In 
Albany County, a candidate for county legislator was denied a place on the ballot in part 
because his petitions were held together with a spring clip, and the court upheld the ruling 
of the Albany County Board of Elections that the spring clip did not constitute a binding.20 
Likewise, if a petition is not filed during the precise period of time specified by the law, the 
candidate may be barred from the ballot. In one instance in 1987, candidates for local 
office filed their designating petitions at 8:30 a.m., shortly after the Village Clerk arrived at 
work, rather than between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., as the law instructs. The 
candidates were thrown off the ballot.21 
These examples are not isolated instances. Last year, New York accounted for one 
half of all the election law litigation in the country.22 In 1986 alone, 200 New York 
candidates in primary elections were denied places on the ballot because of technical 
errors on their petitions, even though they had significant public support and had 
18Braxton v. Mahoney, 63 N.Y.2d 691 , 468 N.E.2d 1111 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1984). 
19Higby v. Mahoney, 48 N.Y.2d 15, 396 N.E.2d 183, 421 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1979). 
20Bouldin v. Scaringe, 133 A.D.2d 287, 519 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1987). 
21 128 A.D.2d 978, 512 N.Y.S.2d 934 (3d Dep't 1987) . 
22see, .!Lll_, New York Newsday May 17, 1988, at p. 20 quoting Angelo T. Cometa, chairman of the New York State Bar 
Association's Special Committee on Election Law. 
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substantially complied with the Election Law's procedural requirements. These technicalities 
effectively disenfranchise tens of thousands of voters every year. 
Worse still, the ballot access laws overwhelmingly favor incumbents and candidates 
with the support of the party organization. These candidates have access to large numbers 
of highly experienced party volunteers who can get two or three times the number of 
signatures necessary to survive challenges to their petitions, and are able through the party 
organization to hire experts and lawyers to review their opponents' petitions and to engage 
in the protracted ballot litigation chronic to New York elections. 
The State Legislature and Governor should appoint a blue-ribbon, multipartisan panel 
to recommend fundamental reformation of the law. And in the interim, the Legislature 
should pass a bill providing that candidates will not be penalized for insubstantial deviations 
from the requirements of the current law. As with campaign finance reform, the incumbents 
who benefit from the ballot access laws are the same officials who hold the power to 
reform them. The public must make it clear to their representatives that they want these 
laws changed. 
23 
PENSION FORFEITURE 
Government is more than the sum of all the interests; it is the paramount interest, the 
public interest. It must be the efficient, effective agent of a responsible citizenry, not 
the shelter of the incompetent and corrupt. 
Adlai Stevenson 
No one believes that crime should pay. Unfortunately, in New York, public officials 
who betray the public trust and are convicted of crimes relating to their position, still receive 
huge sums of the taxpayers' money in the form of pension benefits. 
The case of convicted former Syracuse Mayor Lee Alexander dramatically illustrates 
the problem. Alexander pleaded guilty in January 1988 to federal charges that he turned 
the Mayor's office into a racketeering enterprise and extorted at least $1.2 million from 
contractors doing business with the City during his 16 years as Mayor. He was sentenced 
in March 1986 to ten years in prison. He draws an annual state pension of $18,716. 
The pensions of corrupt judges are likewise insulated. Former State Supreme Court 
Justice William C. Brennen was convicted in December 1985 of accepting almost $50,000 in 
bribes to fix four criminal cases. Released after serving 26 months in prison, he receives 
$41,236 per year. The former Supreme Court Justice and Administrative Judge of Queens 
County, Francis X. Smith, who was convicted of perjury in 1987 in a Queens cable 
television scandal, receives $47,877 annually. 
Convicted New York City employees are similarly treated. John Cassiliano, a former 
superintendent of the City Sanitation Department's Bureau of Waste Management, pleaded 
guilty to federal racketeering charges. Over an eight-year period, Cassiliano permitted 
millions of gallons of hazardous chemical waste to be dumped in New York City's solid 
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waste landfills, collecting more than $660,000 in bribes and payoffs in return. While New 
York City still struggles, at a cost of millions of dollars, to clean up the environmental 
damage Cassiliano left behind, taxpayers are footing a second bill: in the six years since 
Cassiliano retired, he has collected almost $125,000 in pension benefits, and the checks 
totalling more than $20,000 keep rolling in every year. 
Cassiliano is not alone. Alex Liberman, the former Deputy Director of the New York 
City Department of General Services, pleaded guilty in June 1984 to a federal racketeering 
charge of extorting over $1 million from building owners seeking to lease space to the City. 
Liberman got 12 years in jail and a $9,951 annual City pension. 
New York's retirement systems should be explicitly based on the principle that the 
faithful and honest performance of a public employee's official duties is as much a 
precondition to eligibility for a pension as fulfilling the existing statutory age and length of 
service requirements. In the public sector, pensions are not merely a form of deferred 
compensation. They are a "reward for faithfulness to duty and honesty of performance."23 
Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Massachusetts have all enacted pension 
forfeiture statutes which recognize that loyal, honest public service is a prerequisite to 
pension eligibility. New York must do the same, although we should leave room for a 
portion of the convict's public pension to be paid to his or her spouse, children or other 
beneficiaries upon demonstration to a judge of severe financial hardship. It is time we put 
an end to the unjustifiable practice of pensioning corrupt public officials at public expense. 
23Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N.Y 2d 222, 238, 356 N,Y.S.2d 833 (1974). 
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OPEN MEETINGS LAW 
Secrecy and a free, democratic government don't mix. 
Hany S. Truman 
Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, 
who have a right ... and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, an 
indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied 
kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers. 
John Adams 
A dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, 1765 
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be 
performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully 
aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen 
to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy. The 
people must be able to remain informed if they are to retain public control over those 
who are their public servants. It is the only climate under which the commonweal will 
prosper and enable the governmental process to operate for the benefit of those who 
created it. 
Legislative Declaration, New Yor1c State 
Open Meetings Law, 1976 
Back room decisions about the public's business breed self-dealing and disregard of 
the public's interest. Democracy demands public participation in public issues, and when 
that participation is undermined, apathy, cynicism and an erosion of confidence in the 
integrity of government are the sure results. 
New York's Open Meetings Law, as first enacted in 1976, recognized that openness 
and honesty in government are fundamentally linked. Summarized simply, it required that 
"every meeting of a public body shall be open to the public,"24 that these meetings should 
be announced in advance, and the minutes should be available to anyone who wants to 
see them. 
24N.Y. Pub. Off. Law Section 103(a). 
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Obviously, exceptions to this rule are necessary. The law properly exempts 
discussions about collective bargaining negotiations, litigation, and most judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. These exemptions reflect a balance between the principle that the 
public's business must be conducted in a public manner, and the recognition that certain 
deliberations must be free from the pressures that accompany publicity. 
Unfortunately, this balance is upset by another recent exemption, so broad it can be 
exploited to effectively gut the law. In 1985 the State Legislature passed an amendment to 
the law allowing private political caucuses, 
.. . without regard to (i) the subject matter under discussion, including discussion of 
public business, (ii) the majority or minority status of such political committees, 
conferences and caucuses, or (iii) whether such political committees, conferences 
and caucuses invite staff or guests to participate in their deliberations ... 25 
Many communities in our state are dominated by one political party. The 1985 amendment 
means that in these areas, a majority of the legislative body can meet privately as a politi?al 
party caucus and effectively reach binding decisions on public business. Worse, they can 
systematically exclude democratically elected representatives from the minority party from 
any role in the decision-making process. 
For example, the sole Republican member of the Rochester City Council testified in 
hearings before the Commission that the Democratic majority regularly met in closed 
caucus and received "agenda briefings" by staff and others on various matters, including an 
industrial expansion in that Republican member's district; a review of the proposed line item 
school budget by the superintendent of schools and school board; and a statement by a 
utility representative on the utility's stand on a proposed reassessment program. As the 
council member stated, "My exclusion prevents me from representing my constituents 
adequately because city policy questions are decided at closed meetings outside my 
presence." 
25N.Y. Pub. Off. Law Section 108(2)(b) . The amendment was introduced just six weeks after reporters from the New York 
Post obtained an advisory opinion from the Committee on Open Government that caucuses held by a majority of the members 
of either house of the New York State Legislature for the purpose of conducting public business are subject to the law. The 
amendment was passed by both houses a week later, and Governor Cuomo signed it within 24 hours. 
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The enforcement provisions of the law are feeble. The law allows less-than-quorum 
meetings to be held secretly, even if the participants in the meeting systematically rotate 
people in and out for the express purpose of insuring that there is never a quorum present. 
Such behavior should be expressly prohibited. In addition, after secret deliberations, if the 
final vote is taken in public, the courts do not have the power to void the decision. 
Obviously, this law must be given teeth, including fines against public officials who 
intentionally flout the law's provisions. 
Open meetings, like democracy itself, are not always pleasant or convenient. As 
one witness testified, 
Yes, it is uncomfortable to vote yourself a pay raise in public. Yes, it is 
uncomfortable to talk about a school with asbestos in it in front of anxious parents. 
Yes, it is uncomfortable to talk about where to locate low income housing when you 
have people in the audience who might live next to the site, but, whoever said 
democracy had to be easy or comfortable? 
Every time a citizen sees a closed meeting as a blind for misconduct, democracy suffers. 
We all wonder for good reason what officials have to hide when they wrap themselves in a 
cloak of secrecy. 
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CONCLUSION 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no 
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
The Federalist, No. 51 
When the recent corruption scandals broke in the New York City government and in 
the State Legislature, officials across the political spectrum declared that they were fully 
committed to sweeping change, ready to do whatever was necessary to reform the 
government. And in the last two years, there have been some moves in the right direction. 
New York City has a new public campaign finance law and a tougher ethics law. The State 
has a new ethics law, and the housekeeping accounts of the major political parties are 
finally open to public scrutiny. But, as noted elsewhere in this report, these reforms do not 
go nearly far enough. 
The stakes are high for all New Yorkers in the next state legislative session. It is 
clear what needs to be done. The Commission's recommendations, and the similar outcry 
of civic groups, bar associations, concerned citizens, and editorial boards throughout New 
York, must be heeded. When, according to a poll conducted for the Commission earlier in 
the year, only 27% of the voters in our state believe that "most people who run for public 
office are honest," our democracy is in trouble. We cannot afford more of the same. 
The recommendations of the Commission follow thorough investigation. If adopted 
they will change the political climate in our State from one of mistrust and cynicism, to one 
much closer to the ideal of openness and honesty. 
But right now, these are only recommendations. That is all a Moreland Act 
Commission can provide. The Commission is neither a lobby, nor representative of a 
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special interest, nor a citizen's advocacy group. Now it is up to our representatives to take 
action. It is time for our officials to rise above partisanship and self-interest, and enact the 
tough reforms we must have, reforms that may require that they give up personal 
advantage for the common good. So be it; that is what it means when we say, "public 
service is a public trust." And as citizens, we must stay informed about these issues and 
work actively for change, and we must be willing to pay for such reforms as public 
campaign financing and adequate enforcement of new laws. None of us can escape the 
stark choice we face: recurring scandal and ever-deepening apathy if we continue to 
ignore these problems, or a new era of inspiration and change if we are willing to meet the 
tasks at hand with determination and conviction. 
The battle against lethargy and self-dealing has never been easy. But we must go 
forward nonetheless. 
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APPENDIX A - Executive Order 88.1, creating the Commission on Government Integrity. 
No. 88.1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
Executive Chamber 
APPOINTING SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS TO INVESTIGATE INSTANCES OF 
CORRUPTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT AND TO DETERMINE 
THE ADEQUACY OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO 
GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 
WHEREAS, in March 1986, I, acting jointly with the Mayor of the City of New 
York, appointed the State-City Commission on Integrity in Government to make 
recommendations for improving laws, regulations and procedures relating to the prevention 
of corruption, favoritism, undue influence and abuse of official position in government; 
WHEREAS, such Commission has issued reports identifying serious flaws in 
certain existing laws, regulations and procedures within the subject matter of its inquiry; 
WHEREAS, such Commission has issued a final report in which it 
recommends the appointment of a new Commission with investigative powers, including the 
authority to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of 
records; 
WHEREAS, since the appointment of such Commission last March, events 
bearing on public confidence in the integrity of government have continued to unfold; 
WHEREAS, certain completed and ongoing criminal prosecutions raise issues 
relating to integrity in government which are more appropriately explored in a parallel 
investigation than in the course of such prosecutions; and 
WHEREAS, it is my judgment that it is of compelling public importance that 
weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures relating to government integrity be 
further investigated and addressed; 
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NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to section six and subdivision eight of section 
sixty-three of the Executive Law, I, MARIO M. CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York, 
do hereby: 
I. Appoint a Commission to be known as the Commission on Government Integrity 
with seven members, who shall be John D. Feerick, Richard D. Emery, Patricia M. Hynes, 
James L. Magavern, Bernard S. Meyer, Bishop Emerson J. Moore and Cyrus R. Vance, as 
special commissioners, to investigate the management and affairs of any department, board, 
bureau, commission (including any public benefit corporation) or political subdivision of the 
State in respect to the adequacy of laws, regulations and procedures relating to maintaining 
ethical practices and standards in government, assuring that public servants are duly 
accountable for the faithful discharge of the public trust reposed in them, and preventing 
favoritism, conflicts of interest, undue influence and abuse of official position and to make 
recommendations for action to strengthen and improve such laws, regulations and 
procedures. 
II. The Commission shall, subject to Paragraph I of this order: 
1. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures intended 
to prevent the use of public or political party position for personal enrichment 
and determine whether such weaknesses create an undue potential for 
corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official position or 
otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government. 
2. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures intended 
to prohibit conflicts of interest or bring about the disclosure of potential 
conflicts of interest and determine whether such weaknesses create an undue 
potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official 
position or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government. 
3. Investigate weaknesses in existing enforcement machinery for laws, 
regulations and procedures relating to unethical practices and determine 
whether such weaknesses create undue potential for corruption, favoritism, 
undue influence or abuse of official position or otherwise impair public 
confidence in the integrity of government. 
4. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures regarding 
the sale or leasing of real property by or to governments, public authorities or 
public benefit corporations, the sponsorship of publicly assisted housing or 
other development projects, the solicitation of government business, permits, 
franchises, and the like and determine whether such weaknesses create an 
undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official 
position or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government. 
5. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures relating 
to campaign contributions and campaign expenditures and determine whether 
such weaknesses create an undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue 
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influence or abuse of official position or otherwise impair public confidence in 
the integrity of government. 
6. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures regarding 
the representation of private parties by public or political party officials before 
public agencies and determine whether such weaknesses create an undue 
potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official 
position or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government. 
7. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures regarding 
the selection of judges and to determine whether such weaknesses create an 
undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official 
position or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government. 
Ill. John D. Feerick is hereby designated Chairman of the Commission. I hereby give 
and grant to the Commissioners all the powers and authorities that may be given or 
granted oto persons appointed by me under authority of section six of the Executive Law, 
provided, however, that (1) the issuance of subpoenas shall require the prior approval of 
the Chairman and at least three other Commissioners and (2) the Commissioners may 
adopt such procedures as they believe necessary governing the exercise of the powers and 
authorities given or granted to the Commissioners pursuant to such section six. 
IV. Pursuant to subdivision eight of section sixty-three of the Executive Law, and subject 
to Paragraph I of this Order, I hereby direct the Attorney General to inquire into the matters 
set forth in Paragraph I of this Order which I find involve public peace, public safety and 
public justice, and request that the Attorney General do so by appointing one or more of 
the above named Commissioners or their counsels or deputies as Deputy Attorneys General 
and delegating to such Deputy Attorneys General authority to exercise the investigative 
powers that are provided for in an investigation pursuant to such section sixty-three upon a 
majority vote of the Commission and with the approval of the Chairman. 
V. The Chairman shall have the power to employ such counsel, deputies, officers and 
other persons as the Commission may require to accomplish the purposes of this order 
and to fix their compensation. 
VI. The Commission in its inquiry shall comply with section seventy-three of the Civil 
Rights Law and with such other regulations and procedures as the Commission may adopt 
to protect the rights of those affected by its inquiry and the integrity of its proceedings. 
VII. If in the course of its inquiry the Commission obtains evidence of the violation of 
existing law, such evidence shall promptly be communicated to the appropriate law 
enforcement authorities. The Commission shall cooperate with prosecutorial agencies to 
avoid jeopardizing ongoing investigations and prosecutions. 
VIII. Every department, board, bureau, commission (including any public benefit 
corporation) or political subdivision of the State shall provide to the Commission every 
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assistance and cooperation, including use of State facilities, which may be necessary or 
desirable for the accomplishment of the duties or purposes of this Order. 
IX. Executive Order Number 88, dated January 15, 1987, is superseded by this 
Executive Order. 
(L. $ .) 
BY THE GOVERNOR 
/s/ Gerald C. Crotty 
Secretary to the Governor 
G I V E N under my hand and the Privy 
Seal of the State in the City of 
New York this 21st day of April in 
the year one thousand nine hundred 
eighty-seven. 
/s/ Mario M. Cuomo 
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Appendix B - Reports and materials available from the Commission 
The Commission has issued several reports in the course of its work that provide 
more detailed information on the subjects explored here. These reports are: 
1. Campaign Financing: Preliminary Report, issued December 21, 1987. 
2. Open Meetings Law: Report and Recommendations, issued December 21, 1987. 
3. Ethics in Government Act: Report and Recommendations, issued April 6, 1988. 
4. Becoming ~ Judge: Report on the Failings of Judicial Elections in New York State, 
issued May 19, 1988. 
5. Crime Shouldn't Pay: A Pension Forfeiture Statute for New York, issued May 1988. 
6. Access to the Ballot in Primary Elections: The Need for Fundamental Reform, 
issued June 27, 1988. 
7. Campaian Finance Reform: The Public Perspective, issued July 1988. (Results of 
a poll conducted for the Commission by Dresner, Sykes, Jordan & Townsend, 
Inc.) 
8. The Albany Money Machine: Campaign Financing for New York Legislative Races, 
issued August 1988. 
9. Unfinished Business: Campaign Finance Reform in New York Q!y, issued 
September 28, 1988. 
Also, as mentioned earlier in the report, the Commission has computerized the records 
of the State Board of Elections. Printouts of the data base are available for copying, and 
the Commission will provide the entire database on computer diskette free of charge to 
interested parties. The available printouts include: 
1. Statewide Officeholders New York State: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by 
contributor or alphabetically by contributor address. 
2. Citywide Officeholders New York City: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by 
contributor or alphabetically by contributor address. 
3. State~ Committees (Democratic) New York State: 1/1/81-1/1/88. Sorted 
alphabetically by contributor. 
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4. State~ Committees (Republican) New York State: 12/7/81-1/1/87. Sorted 
alphabetically by contributor. 
5. Legislative ~ Committees (Senate Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82.-2/11/88. 
Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
6. Legislative~ Committees (Senate Republican) New York State: 11/29/82.-1/1/88. 
Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
7. Legislative~ Committees (Assembly Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82-
3/4/88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
8. Legislative ~ Committees (Assembly Republican) New York State: 11 /30/82-
3/11 /88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
9. Citywide Officeholders New York City, Update: 1/88-7/88. Sorted alphabetically by 
contributor. 
1 O. Borough Presidents - New York City: 1/83-7/88. Sorted by Borough President, 
alphabetically by contributor. 
11. Legislative Leaders - First Run: 86 New York State Senators and Assemblymen: 
1/85-7/88. Individual reports on each, sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
The Commission has also held a number of public hearings in the course of our 
investigations. Transcripts are available for the following: 
1. October 21-23, 1987 in New York City and Buffalo. Forums on campaign financing 
with expert witnesses, including Dr. Herbert Alexander. 
2. November 4-5, 1987 in Rochester. Hearing on the Open Meetings Law. 
3. January 26, 1988 in Albany. Hearing on the Poughkeepsie Town Board election of 
1985. 
4. March 3 & 9, 1988 in New York City. Hearing on Judicial Selection procedures in 
New York State. 
5. March 14-15, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Focusing on fund-raising 
practices of statewide and New York Citywide officeholders; received testimony from 
their fund-raisers and from large contributors. 
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6. June 20, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing, New York City: including 
testimony of Mayor Koch, City Council President Stein, and Comptroller Goldin. 
7. September 23, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: New York State 
Comptroller Regan's fund-raising practices. 
8. October 25, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Continuation of January 
26, 1988 hearing into the 1985 Poughkeepsie Town Board Election -- emphasis on 
New York State Board of Elections investigation. 
9. November 22, 1988, in Albany. Hearing on Commission's proposed Municipal Ethics 
Act. 
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